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BUYING A DIGITAL DOWNLOAD?  YOU MAY NOT OWN 





Recent Ninth Circuit decisions in which the court examined 
the traditional notion that ownership of an authorized copy of a copy-
righted work transfers when that copy is first publicly distributed by 
the copyright owner may have oppressive effects for consumers of 
digital downloads.  Historically, upon this first distribution, also 
known as a first sale,1 the owner of the copy is able to raise certain 
affirmative defenses to copyright infringement.2  However, complica-
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2012, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S., 
cum laude, Ithaca College.  Special thanks to Professor Rena Seplowitz and the members of 
the Touro Law Review for their advice and assistance, and to my family and Justin for their 
patience and support during the last three years. 
1 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2011) (“Under 
[§ 106(3)] the copyright owner would have the right to control the first public distribution of 
an authorized copy or phonorecord of his work, whether by sale, gift, loan, or some rental or 
lease arrangement.”); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977) (referring 
to the distribution as a “first sale”). 
2 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a) (2006) (first sale doctrine), 117(a) (2006) (essential step de-
fense).  The first sale doctrine states, in pertinent part, 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a par-
ticular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copy-
right owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord. 
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (emphasis added).  The essential step defense states, in pertinent part, 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement 
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the 
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program pro-
vided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in 
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine 
and that it is used in no other manner, or 
1
Lahm: Buying a Digital Download ?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
212 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
tions arise when restrictive contractual agreements accompany the 
copy, because these agreements may place enough constraints upon a 
consumer‟s use that he may not own the purchased copy.  For        
example, a consumer who purchases digital downloads often does so 
through an online music store and must agree to the store‟s terms; 
however he generally does not receive an express transfer of title to 
the copy3 purchased.4  Moreover, by agreeing to the store‟s terms, the 
consumer likely agrees to terms that limit ownership rights granted 
by the Copyright Act, effectively becoming a licensee rather than an 
owner of a copy.  Because licenses and contracts play such an active 
role in the purchase of digital downloads, consumers of these down-
loads probably do not own the copies they purchase and are therefore 
not protected by the ownership rights under the Copyright Act.  This 
Comment will demonstrate that consumers of digital downloads need 
additional protection as possessors of copies. 
 
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and 
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued posses-
sion of the computer program should cease to be rightful. 
17 U.S.C. § 117(a). 
3 For purposes of this Comment, all material objects, such as phonorecords, which embo-
dy the copyright, such as sound recordings, will often be referred to as “copies.”  See 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.03[C] (Matthew Bend-
er, rev. ed. 2010) (hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER) (“The same distinction is made as be-
tween „sound recordings,‟ which are works of authorship, and „phonorecords,‟ which merely 
embody such sounds.”).  A “phonorecord” is not included in the definition of “copy,” which 
strictly refers to the material object embodying a copyrighted work that is not a sound re-
cording.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra.  However, in 
many instances, the two are treated the same under the Copyright Act, see id. (referring to 
the distinction as an “unnecessary complexity”), and thus, will collectively often be referred 
to as “copies.”  Any relevant distinctions will be noted as necessary. 
4 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-riding Role of Contract, 51 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311 (2011) (“In the digital era, all of the traditional content indus-
tries have moved to a mixed model of distribution and many new industries only use digital 
distributions subject to license agreements.”); see, e.g., Software License Agreement for 
iTunes, APPLE, http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/itunes.pdf (last updated Feb. 10, 2010) 
(requiring that the consumer agree to the agreement in order to use the software); iTunes 
Store Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html (last 
updated June 21, 2010) (indicating that the agreement governs the consumer‟s use of the 
iTunes music store to access digital content); Purchasing Music, iTunes Store Category 
listed on iTunes A to Z, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/features/#purchasingmusic (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2010) (describing the iTunes store and how consumers use it to purchase 
music); see also Greg Raburn, Digital Content and the Repo Man, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 35, 49 
(Winter 2011) (describing the similar effect the digital era is having on the distribution of 
books, stating that, for example, the Terms of Use used for Amazon‟s Kindle “likely means 
that Amazon does not consider an e-book to be covered by the first sale doctrine, and there-
fore views an e-book as more akin to software than an actual book”). 
2
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In September 2010, the Ninth Circuit held in Vernor v.       
Autodesk, Inc.5 that the lawful possessor of authorized copies of a 
computer software program did not own those copies.6  Rather, the 
court found that the copyright owner granted a license to the posses-
sor, as evidenced by a written agreement that provided for limited use 
of the copies and restrictions on distribution and reproduction rights.7 
Only months later, with respect to music recordings, the Ninth 
Circuit in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto8 held that the possessor 
of copies of promotional compact discs (“CDs”) did in fact own those 
copies, despite the copyright owner‟s attempt to enforce licensing 
language and use restrictions placed on the products‟ packaging.9  
The court distinguished the CD recipients in UMG from the computer 
program users in Vernor based on their respective relationships with 
the copyright owners.10  Notwithstanding the attempt to create a li-
censing notice on the package,11 UMG did not control or formally 
monitor the use or further transfer of the copies,12 whereas Autodesk 
imposed and executed significant use and transfer restrictions.13  
Moreover, UMG mailed the CDs without receiving such a request or 
payment from the recipients;14 Autodesk typically received payment 
for the software copies following the customers‟ requests for the pro-
gram.15  As a result, the court in UMG limited the holding in Vernor 
 
5 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-1421, 2011 WL 4530222 (Oct. 3, 
2011); see Christopher Barnett, Supreme Court Allows Pro-Autodesk Decision to Remain 
Intact in Ninth Circuit, SOFTWARE AUDIT BLOG (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.scottandscottllp.com/main/Supreme_Court_Allows.aspx#page=1 (“The Supreme 
Court‟s refusal to hear the case means that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, software publishers 
like Autodesk may continue to seek injunctions and other remedies against those who at-
tempt to distribute copies of a copyrighted software product without a license.”). 
6 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. 
7 Id. (“We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy 
where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly 
restricts the user‟s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.  
Applying our holding to Autodesk‟s [software license agreement], we conclude that [the 
possessor] was a licensee rather than an owner of the copies . . . .”). 
8 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
9 Id. at 1180. 
10 Id. at 1183. 
11 The court noted that there was no evidence that the recipients accepted the alleged li-
cense agreement or its restrictions.  Id. at 1182, 1183. 
12 Id. at 1180, 1183. 
13 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2010). 
14 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180-81 (citing Unordered Merchandise Statute, 39 U.S.C. § 
3009(a), (b) (2006)). 
15 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104. 
3
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to software users because software users were in “a very different po-
sition from that held by the recipients of UMG‟s promotional CDs.”16 
Although the Ninth Circuit must have believed that Vernor 
and UMG were consistent with respect to the rules of law for com-
puter programs and promotional CDs individually,17 the decisions, 
when read broadly to apply beyond computer software and promo-
tional CDs, left unanswered whether possessors of copies of digital 
music downloads were owners or licensees.  Arguably, those that 
purchase digital downloads are not in a “very different position” from 
the computer software users in Vernor, because music downloads are 
often purchased and transmitted using computer software programs 
subject to license agreements.18  Therefore, the distinctions drawn by 
the Ninth Circuit to separate the recipient of a promotional CD from a 
computer software user do not exist with a buyer of a digital down-
load.19  Although similar to UMG in that the downloaded file is a 
copy rather than software,20 the downloaded file ultimately more 
closely resembles the software in Vernor because the copyright own-
er retains control through the use of a software program and software 
agreement.21  While digital downloads do not fall perfectly within the 
parameters of either case, Vernor seems more applicable due to the 
existence of the software program and the use and transfer              
restrictions placed upon possessors of the copies.22  Thus, digital 
download consumers are arguably licensees under Vernor. 
The distinction between an owner of a copy and a licensee of 
the copyright who merely possesses a copy is important because an 
owner of a copy is entitled to certain rights under the Copyright Act 
(“the Copyright Act” or “the Act”).23  Furthering this distinction,       
§ 202 of the Copyright Act creates a statutory division between the 
 
16 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (“Th[e] formulation [from Vernor] . . . applies in terms to soft-
ware users . . . .”). 
17 The judicial panel was the same for both cases.  Id. at 1177; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1103. 
18 See supra note 4 (citing agreements used by Apple‟s iTunes). 
19 See supra text accompanying notes 10-16 (noting that the court in UMG justified its 
decision to find ownership based on: (1) the minimal level of control retained by the copy-
right owner and (2) the object‟s dissimilarities from software). 
20 Compare NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E], with UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183. 
21 Compare supra note 4, with Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12. 
22 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12 (describing the “significant” use and transfer restric-
tions placed on the software user). 
23 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Vernor, 621 F.3d at 
1107 (describing certain ownership rights that are “unavailable to those who are only li-
censed to use their copies of copyrighted works”). 
4
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copyright and the object embodying it.24  An owner of a copy is able 
to raise certain affirmative defenses to infringement claims, and such 
ownership may be transferred separately from the copyright, regard-
less of whether rights in the copyright are licensed.25  In other words, 
ownership of a copy is dependent on the physical object embodying 
the copyright, not the rights authorized by the copyright owner with 
respect to use of the copy.26  Thus, ownership of the copyright is 
based on the ability to engage in acts reserved for the copyright own-
er,27 regardless of whether a copy of the copyrighted work was sold, 
rented, leased, or loaned for the purposes of exercising such rights 
under the copyright.28 
Ownership of copies should not be determined by contractual 
restrictions governing the copyright.29  In order to remain consistent 
with the Copyright Act, title in downloads should pass to the con-
sumers with the sale of the copy, regardless of the restrictions placed 
on the use of the copyright.30  Of course, consistent with contract 
 
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copy-
right, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the 
work is embodied.  Transfer of ownership of any material object, includ-
ing the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of 
itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; 
nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a cop-
yright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property 
rights in any material object. 
Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.; Robert J. Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, Promotional CDs and Software Face 
First Sale Doctrine, N.Y.L.J., (Jan. 21, 2011), available at Lexis. 
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A „transfer of copyright ownership‟ is an assignment, mortgage, 
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of 
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or 
place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”).  Note that one can be a copyright 
owner by obtaining an exclusive license, which authorizes that person or company to use 
some or all of the rights within the copyright.  See id. 
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Bernstein, supra note 26. 
29 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (noting the separation between the copy and the copyright); 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (“[T]he first sale inquiry examines 
ownership of the tangible property in which the copyrighted work has been embodied, not 
ownership of the copyright itself.”). 
30 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3.  In Nimmer & Nimmer‟s discussion of Microsoft 
Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), where the 
court found that “Microsoft only license[d] and d[id] not sell its [p]roducts,” id. at 213, they 
stated that the court “entirely misunderstood the first sale doctrine” if it “inferred simply 
from the fact that the copyright to the software was licensed to end-users that Section 109(a) 
was therefore somehow inapplicable . . . .”  NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3. 
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principles, a consumer could contract away his right to ownership; 
however, the consumer‟s lack of ownership would be the result of the 
agreement rather than the result of restrictions placed on the copy-
right.31  Thus, if rights under a copyright were licensed to the con-
sumer, as they were in Vernor, it would be possible that the consumer 
nevertheless owned the copies being used to exercise those rights.32  
The consumer would still be able to exercise his rights as an owner of 
a copy even though a license was granted with respect to the copy-
right. 
Moreover, even if the language of § 202 was strictly con-
strued, as previously proposed, and consumers were deemed to be 
owners of the downloaded copies in their possession, the defenses 
available to them would be nearly useless.  The nature of digital 
downloads seemingly requires a license to use the copyright because 
consumers must be able to exercise rights exclusively reserved for the 
copyright owner which are not included in the defenses.33  For exam-
ple, to resell a download under the first sale doctrine, the consumer is 
 
31 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6 (stating that a person could be contractually liable if 
there was a violation of an agreement following a first sale; however, the person would not 
have infringed upon the copyright); Nimmer, supra note 4, at 1312 (stating that all transac-
tions are not inherently first sales, and that the right to own a product may be limited by  
contract). 
32 Cf. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12 (finding that the copy was not owned because the cop-
yright was licensed). 
33 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117.  Section 106 states, 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this 
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106.  See supra note 2 for 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a) and 117 (first sale doctrine and 
essential step defense). 
6
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required to sell the machine on which the file was downloaded,34 be-
cause the first sale doctrine does not grant to the owner of a copy the 
right to make any necessary reproductions in order to resell that 
copy.35  Prohibited reproductions include making copies on to a CD 
or media player.  On the other hand, if the download were a computer 
program, which is protected by the essential step defense, the con-
sumer would be able to make the necessary reproductions, because 
such reproductions are necessary for the file‟s intended use.36 
Consequently, the only protection that would be available for 
owners of digital files under the current Copyright Act is the fair use 
doctrine.37  However, reliance on the fair use doctrine is unreasonable 
when a license agreement accompanies a digital product, because the 
consumer‟s use of the copy will be restricted by that license agree-
ment and the associated digital rights management systems used by 
copyright owners in an attempt to battle piracy and infringement in 
the digital age.38  Although the consumer may be the owner of the 
 
34 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E] (indicating that one qualifies as a 
lawful owner of a copy by owning the machine on which it is stored, because it is the ma-
chine‟s RAM which contains the copy). 
35 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).  Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (allowing owners of software program copies 
to make necessary reproductions). 
36 See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (allowing necessary reproductions for software programs); 
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (same). 
37 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  The fair use doctrine states, 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an in-
fringement of copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work 
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall in-
clude-- 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the co-
pyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair 
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
Id. 
38 See infra note 169. 
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physical product embodying the digital files,39 a strict and overly con-
trolling license agreement may have the effect of rendering useless 
the ownership rights under the Copyright Act. 
As long as a license is required to use an object, owners and 
possessors of copies are contractually limited in their rights, regard-
less of the rights granted by the Copyright Act.  These difficulties 
may demonstrate why courts have found that the existence of a li-
cense establishes a lack of ownership of the copy.  Copies may be 
leased for purposes of exercising rights granted to the possessors by 
the copyright owner, meaning they are not owned by consumers.  On 
the other hand, copies may be owned in addition to rights being      
licensed, but the license has the capability of hindering the effective-
ness of the ownership rights.  Either way, the existence of a license 
trumps, or at least has the potential to trump, the rights belonging to 
an owner of a copy. 
This Comment demonstrates that consumers of digital down-
loads are likely not owners of the copies they purchase based on the 
Ninth Circuit‟s recent interpretations of the Copyright Act,40 and 
therefore need additional protection as possessors of copies.  Howev-
er, even if court decisions in the near future hold otherwise, the cur-
rent Act would be ineffective in governing their ownership rights 
when the use of the copies is subject to a license agreement, as are 
most digital downloads.41  Section I discusses the distinction between 
the exclusive rights comprised in the copyright and the object embo-
dying the copyrighted work, and the difference between a copyright 
owner and an owner of a copy.  Section II explores methods of de-
termining ownership of copies and examines conflicts that have ari-
sen between the Copyright Act and recent Ninth Circuit cases as digi-
tal media becomes increasingly popular.  Section III evaluates the 
effects of the Ninth Circuit‟s decisions, ultimately concluding that 
consumers of digital downloads are limited in their rights regardless 
of whether they are found to own the copies of the musical record-
ings.  Finally, Section IV discusses the need for changes in the Copy-
right Act to preserve consumers‟ rights as digital downloads become 
 
39 This includes digitally transmitted files.  See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 
8.12[E]. 
40 See UMG v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011); Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 
F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
41 Cf. UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (finding that no effective license existed because UMG‟s 
attempt to limit use restrictions were insufficient to create a license). 
8
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the norm, and the line between the copy and the copyright begins to 
fade. 
II. THE BASICS: DISTINGUISHING THE COPYRIGHT FROM THE 
COPY AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNER FROM THE OWNER OF 
THE COPY 
The Copyright Act distinguishes between the copyright and 
the object embodying it.42  The Eleventh Circuit has aptly stated, 
“[C]opyright is a series of specified rights to which a designated 
work is subject . . . .  One may use the work without using the copy-
right, but one cannot use the copyright without using the work – one 
does not infringe the work, rather one infringes the copyright.”43 
The Act grants varying protections to both the owners of the 
copyright and the owners of the embodying object.44  The owner of a 
copyright has the exclusive rights of reproduction in copies or phono-
records, preparation of derivative works, public distribution of copies 
or phonorecords, public performance, public display, and public per-
formance of sound recordings by digital audio transmission.45  Ac-
cordingly, the copyright owner is entitled to authorize any of these 
rights, such as reproduction and distribution.46  Copyright owners in 
the digital age authorize this publishing right to digital distributors 
and publishing companies, from which consumers may purchase cop-
ies of the embodying object.47  Conversely, a consumer who owns a 
copy is, with few exceptions, prohibited from exercising or authoriz-
ing these exclusive rights.48  Two exceptions are the first sale doc-
 
42 17 U.S.C. § 202; see supra note 24. 
43 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543 n.23 (11th Cir. 1996). 
44 17 U.S.C. § 202; Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1111-12; F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. 
Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 961-62, 965 (9th Cir. 2010). 
45 17 U.S.C. § 106; see supra note 33. 
46 17 U.S.C. § 101 (noting that copyright ownership may be transferred using an exclusive 
license); Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111-12 (holding that Autodesk licensed its software to pro-
gram users); F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 967 (finding that the copyright owner licensed repro-
duction and distribution rights to third party distributors). 
47 Nimmer, supra note 4; see Michael I. Rudell & Neil J. Rosini, Electronic Books Re-
shape Publishing Industry, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 2010, at 3 (noting that, based on state contract 
law and the original publishing license between parties, the right to publish e-books may lie 
with the publishing company distributing the physical book or may lie with the author, who 
may work directly with a digital distributor to distribute the work). 
48 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Although 
. . . the owner of the copyright[] has exclusive rights in the promotional CDs, „exemptions, 
compulsory licenses, and defenses found in the Copyright Act narrow [those] rights.‟ ”) 
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trine and the essential step defense, both of which provide owners of 
copies with an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.49 
To see the difference between the copy and the copyright,   
review the classic example of a book50: A consumer who enters a 
bookstore and purchases a book has the right to take the book home, 
read it, place it on a shelf, or even use it as a paperweight.51  The con-
sumer owns a copy of the author‟s copyrighted work, and the uses 
just described would not conflict with the copyright owner‟s exclu-
sive rights.52  The same can be applied to one who purchases and 
owns a copy of a music CD, in which the copyright owner has exclu-
sive rights to the musical recording.53 
On the other hand, if the copyright owner were to license the 
copyright, say to a publishing company for purposes of public distri-
bution, the copyright owner would be granting permission to exercise 
one of the exclusive rights.54  This right is granted separately and re-
gardless of whether ownership of a copy was transferred.55  For ex-
 
(quoting Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff‟s Dep‟t, 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
49 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117(a); Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107. 
50 Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (holding that the exclusive right 
to “vend” or sell does not include the right to control future retail sales merely by notice 
without privity of contract regarding such an exclusive right); Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 
F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he author of a book, or her assignee, ordinarily owns the 
copyright in the book and thus the sole right to authorize copying; each purchaser of a copy 
of the book owns that copy, but is generally not entitled to make copies from it.”); NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[C] (“A „book‟ is merely a material object that may embo-
dy, and hence constitute, a copy of a given literary work. . . .  There is but a single work of 
authorship, no matter how numerous and diverse the copies.  By like reasoning, the „author‟ 
is the originator of the intangible material (e.g., the novel) . . . .”). 
51 See Krause, 402 F.3d at 122; Bernstein, supra note 26.  An owner of a copy also has the 
rights prescribed under the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense, which will be 
discussed in Parts II and IV, respectively. 
52 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing the copyright owner‟s exclusive rights); Krause, 402 F.3d at 
122; Bernstein, supra note 26. 
53 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[C] (“The same distinction is made as be-
tween „sound recordings,‟ which are works of authorship, and „phonorecords,‟ which merely 
embody such sounds.”). 
54 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership”); see 17 U.S.C. § 202 
(“[T]ransfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright [does 
not] convey property rights in any material object.”); Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350-51 
(noting that the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright may be transferred by privity of 
contract but not by mere notice). 
55 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 202. 
The principle restated in section 202 [this section] is a fundamental and 
important one: that copyright ownership and ownership of a material ob-
ject in which the copyrighted work is embodied are entirely separate 
10
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ample, in order to exercise the exclusive rights granted, the copy‟s 
possession could transfer either in the form of a loan, rental, or lease 
(in which case the licensee would not own the copy), or in the form 
of a sale or gift (in which case the licensee would own the copy).56  
The fact that an agreement accompanied the transfer of the copy‟s 
possession does not bar a finding of ownership.57  Importantly, when 
there is a transfer of ownership of the copy in addition to a contrac-
tual license of the copyright, a violation of the agreement beyond that 
which pertains to the copyright owner‟s rights is a breach of contract 
rather than copyright infringement.58  As demonstrated, the ability to 
license a copyright and the ability to transfer ownership are distinct 
from each other as required by § 202 of the Copyright Act. 
III. ADAPTING TO A DIGITAL AGE: FINDING A METHOD TO 
DETERMINE OWNERSHIP OF A COPY 
Under the Copyright Act, the right to raise certain affirmative 
defenses to copyright infringement is limited to owners of copies.59  
Thus, for purposes of the defenses, “ownership” is based on owner-
 
things.  Thus, transfer of a material object does not of itself carry any 
rights under the copyright, and this includes transfer of the copy or pho-
norecord--the original manuscript, the photographic negative, the unique 
painting or statue, the master tape recording, etc.--in which the work was 
first fixed.  Conversely, transfer of a copyright does not necessarily re-
quire the conveyance of any material object. 
Id.; Krause, 402 F.3d at 122 (“Ownership of a copy is something distinct from copyright 
ownership.”). 
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”); see 17 U.S.C. § 202 
(indicating that ownership of the copy is separate from ownership of the copyright); NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a]. 
57 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][b] (stating that a resale or use 
restriction placed on the copyrighted item by the copyright holder would not render the pur-
chaser liable in an infringement action for a violation of that restriction). 
58 Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If Autodesk‟s transfer of 
[the software] copies to CTA was a first sale, then CTA‟s resale of the software in violation 
of the SLA‟s terms would be a breach of contract, but would not result in copyright liabili-
ty.” (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977))); see Bobbs-Merrill, 
210 U.S. at 350-51 (noting that privity of contract is required between the copyright owner 
and an owner of a copy in order to limit the rights of the owner of the copy). 
59 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 (“[The first sale doctrine] allows the „owner of a particular 
copy‟ of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his copy without the copyright owner‟s au-
thorization.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109(a))); id. at 1109 (“[A] software user who is the „own-
er of a copy‟ of a copyrighted software program does not infringe by making a copy of the 
computer program, if the new copy is „created as an essential step in the utilization of the 
computer program in conjunction with a machine and . . . is used in no other manner.‟ ” 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1))). 
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ship of the copy rather than ownership of the copyright, and a person 
must own rather than merely possess a copy in order to raise these 
defenses.60  This also means that ownership of the copy could be de-
termined regardless of whether any of the rights comprised in the 
copyright have been transferred.61 
Historically, the copyright owner‟s exclusive right of public 
distribution was limited to “the first public distribution of an autho-
rized copy.”62  This was, and still is, also known as a “first sale,” and 
while a sale is not actually required, such a transfer of possession 
transfers ownership of the copy.63  Upon the transfer of ownership of 
a particular copy, the copyright owner loses the exclusive right to 
control public distribution of that copy.64  Thus, the owner of the 
copy could resell, lend, or dispose of the copy without infringing 
upon the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.65  This first sale 
doctrine, which aids in establishing a transfer of ownership in a copy, 
also acts as an affirmative defense for owners of copies in a suit by 
copyright owners for infringement.66 
The leading Supreme Court case regarding the first sale doc-
trine, Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus,67 held that a copyright own-
er‟s right to distribution, or right to “vend” as it was then called, does 
not include the right to control future retail sales merely by notice of 
such control absent privity of contract regarding the exclusive right at 
issue.68  The Bobbs-Merrill Company, the copyright owner of the li-
terary work embodied in the novel, The Castaway, attempted to re-
strict sales of copies of the novel by printing the following copyright 
statement in the book69: 
 
60 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (“[T]he first sale inquiry ex-
amines ownership of the tangible property in which the copyrighted work has been embo-
died, not ownership of the copyright itself.”). 
61 See id. (“[T]he first sale inquiry examines ownership of the tangible property in which 
the copyrighted work has been embodied, not ownership of the copyright itself.”); see supra 
note 55. 
62 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 106; see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); Bobbs-
Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350. 
63 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1179-80 (9th 
Cir. 2011); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a]. 
64 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179-80 (citing Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350). 
65 See id. (“[A] copyright owner who transfers title in a particular copy to a purchaser or 
donee cannot prevent resale of that particular copy.”); Bernstein, supra note 26. 
66 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179-80 (citing Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350). 
67 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
68 Id. at 350-51. 
69 Id. at 341. 
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The price of this book at retail is [one dollar] net.  No 
dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at 
a less price will be treated as an infringement of the 
copyright.70 
In a suit against Macy & Company, which purchased the books from 
a wholesale dealer and then re-sold them for eighty-nine cents per 
copy,71 the Court found that Congress did not intend to grant copy-
right owners the ability to restrict future sales by use of a printed no-
tice when it granted the “sole right to vend.”72  The right to vend does 
not secure a right to copyright owners past the “sale of the book to a 
purchaser” merely by printing a notice of such a restriction because 
the copyright owner is not in privity of contract with those future 
purchasers.73  Thus, Macy & Company was not bound by the pur-
ported license in the copyright statement because the Bobbs-Merrill 
Company lost its exclusive right to distribute those copies beyond the 
first sale to a purchaser.74 
The first sale doctrine, established in Bobbs-Merrill, was later 
codified in § 109 of the Copyright Act.75  It permits the sale or dispo-
sition of a copyrighted work if the possessor in fact owns that particu-
lar copy.76  Just as in Bobbs-Merrill, the copyright owner loses its 
sole right to vend or distribute the material copy upon the first sale of 
a copy to a purchaser.77  Because the doctrine applies only to “owners 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 342. 
72 Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350-51.  The Court further noted that copyright protection is 
“purely a question of statutory construction,” id. at 350, based on the rights created by Con-
gress pursuant to Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution, id. at 346.  At the time this case was decided, 
Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes of the United States granted to an author the “sole liber-
ty of . . . vending” his work.  Copyright Act of 1891, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1107, reprinted in 
Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 348.  Sections 106(3) and 109 of the current Copyright Act re-
placed the right to vend with the right to distribute, and “[l]ike the exclusive right to „vend‟ 
that was construed in Bobbs-Merrill, the exclusive right to distribute is a limited right.”  
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‟anza Research Int‟l, Inc. 523 U.S. 135, 144 (1998). 
73 Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350. 
74 Id. at 350-51. 
75 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The rule of 
Bobbs-Merrill remains in full force, enshrined as it is in § 109(a) of the [Copyright] Act: a 
copyright owner who transfers title in a particular copy to a purchaser or donee cannot pre-
vent resale of that particular copy.”). 
76 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made 
under this title . . . is entitled . . . to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.”); see UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179. 
77 See Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350 (“The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority 
of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition 
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of copies,” the alleged first sale must transfer ownership of the copy; 
it cannot solely transfer the copy‟s possession accompanied by a 
grant of the copyright owner‟s exclusive rights.78 
The advent of digital content has required copyright owners to 
increase the amount of control they exercise over the copyright and 
consequently the copies that are subject to the terms of the copyright 
authorization.  Thus, when possession of a digital copy is transferred, 
it is difficult to discern whether the transfer is intended as a transfer 
of copyright ownership, a transfer of ownership of the copy, or a 
transfer of both.79  This results in a blurred distinction between the 
copy and the copyright. 
The Ninth Circuit, while wrestling with the applicable stan-
dard for determining ownership of copies in recent decisions, failed 
to maintain the distinction set forth in § 202.80  For example, in 
F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records,81 the Ninth Circuit 
held that the transfer of copies from Aftermath Records, the copy-
right owner, to third party distributors such as iTunes constituted a 
license for the purpose of determining royalty payments due to the 
original copyright owners, F.B.T. Productions.82  The agreement be-
tween F.B.T. and Aftermath set forth a Records Sold provision and a 
Masters Licensed provision; the first required a royalty payment of 
twelve to twenty percent on all “records sold in the United States . . . 
through normal retail channels,”83 and the second required payment 
of fifty percent of “masters licensed . . . for their manufacture and 
 
of it.”). 
78 See UMG, 628 F.3d at 1179-80 (“Particularly with regard to computer software, we 
have recognized that copyright owners may create licensing arrangements so that users ac-
quire only a license to use the particular copy of software and do not acquire title that per-
mits further transfer or sale of that copy without the permission of the copyright owner.”); 
Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010). 
79 In other words, if possession of a digital copy is transferred to a consumer, the copy-
right owner may be intending to: (1) transfer title in that individual copy but retain owner-
ship in the copyright, (2) retain title in the copy but license some or all of the copyright own-
er‟s exclusive rights, or (3) transfer title in the copy and grant a license to some or all of the 
copyright owner‟s rights.  See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 964-
65 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Quality King Distribs. v. L‟anza Research Int‟l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 
145 (1998)); see also UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-11; Krause v. Title-
serv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005). 
80 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (stating the distinction between the copy and the copyright). 
81 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010). 
82 Id. at 964. 
83 Id. at 961. 
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sale of records or for any other uses.”84  F.B.T. argued that the Mas-
ters Licensed provision applied to the downloads transferred to third 
party distributors for purposes of reproduction and distribution, while 
Aftermath argued that the Records Sold provision applied, because 
the copies were sold to the distributors for distribution through “nor-
mal retail channels.”85 
Ultimately, the court held that the records were licensed to 
third party distributors rather than sold, and therefore F.B.T. was 
owed the royalties set forth in the Masters Licensed provision.86  In 
other words, if the masters were licensed, then they could not have 
been sold and the transaction would not fall within the Records Sold 
provision.87  The court acknowledged that the Masters Licensed pro-
vision was broad, but noted that its breadth did not make it ambi-
guous.88  With respect to the transaction between Aftermath and the 
distributors, the court found that Aftermath retained title to the copy-
right and the digital files, retained the right to regain possession, and 
received recurring benefits.89  Therefore, no sale occurred, rendering 
the transaction a license.90 
Finally, to further support its finding, the court cited statutory 
and case law, stating: 
It is easily gleaned from these sources of federal copy-
right law that a license is an authorization by the copy-
right owner to enable another party to engage in beha-
vior that would otherwise be the exclusive right of the 
copyright owner, but without transferring title in those 
rights.  This permission can be granted for the copy-
right itself, for the physical media containing the co-
pyrighted work, or for both the copyright and the 
physical media.91 
 
84 Id.  The parties defined a “master” in the agreement as “recording of sound, without or 
with visual images, which is used or useful in the recording, production or manufacture of 
records.”  Id. at 961-62. 
85 F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 961-62. 
86 Id. at 964. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 965. 
90 F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965. 
91 Id. (citing Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff‟s Dep‟t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 
2006); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 
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The court‟s analysis conflates the distinction between owner-
ship of the copy and ownership of the copyright in two ways.  First, it 
found that the transaction between Aftermath and the distributors was 
a license because it was not a sale.92  In other words, the court at-
tempted to define a “sale” and a “license” as if they were two oppos-
ing methods to obtain possession of the combined copy and copy-
right.93  As a result, if the transaction cannot be categorized as one, 
then it must be the other.94  Because there was no transfer of title in 
the copies and Aftermath retained control over the copies, the court 
concluded that no records were sold, and therefore, the transaction 
must have fallen within the Masters Licensed provision.95  Conse-
quently, ownership of the copyright was dependent on ownership of 
the copy.  This was not the intent of § 202, which allows for the pos-
sibility of a sale of copies independent from the licensing of the rights 
under the copyright.96 
Second, the court‟s definition of “license” allows a copyright 
owner to license the copy rather than the copyright.97  Yet, the defini-
tion also defines licensing as “enabl[ing] another party to engage in 
behavior that would otherwise be the exclusive right of the copyright 
owner,” which correctly speaks to licensing the copyright.98  Al-
though a copy may be necessary to exercise rights licensed under the 
copyright, it is not the copy itself that is being licensed when the cop-
yright is being licensed.99  Rather, the transfer of possession of the 
copy, depending on the circumstances, takes place in the form of a 
 
(9th Cir. 1960)).  Moreover, the court found, “[I]t is well settled that where a copyright own-
er transfers a copy of copyrighted material, retains title [to the material copy], limits the uses 
to which the material may be put, and is compensated periodically based on the transferee‟s 
exploitation of the material, the transaction is a license.”  Id. 
92 Id. at 964-65. 
93 Id. at 965 (“Much as Section 109 describes a „sale‟ under the „first sale‟ doctrine, vari-
ous other sections of the Copyright Act illuminate the meaning of the term „license.‟  For 
example, section 114(f), titled „Licenses for Certain Nonexempt Transmissions,‟ describes 
the statutory authorization for a third party to exercise public performance rights that other-
wise remain the exclusive rights of a copyright holder and defines this authorization as a „li-
cense.‟ ”). 
94 Id. 
95 F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965-66. 
96 17 U.S.C. § 202. 
97 See F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 965. 
98 Id. (emphasis added); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 202. 
99 See Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (holding that the copyright 
owner was unable to place restrictions on the copies by attempting to license its exclusive 
right to vend); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[C]. 
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sale, rental, lease, or loan.100 
Just a few months later, in Vernor v. Autodesk, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the user of a software program was a licensee rather 
than the owner of copies, and therefore, the user did not have the 
right to redistribute physical copies of the software under the first 
sale doctrine because the distribution was in violation of the soft-
ware‟s license agreement.101  The court noted that licensees may 
“rightfully possess, but do not own, [] cop[ies] of copyrighted soft-
ware” and therefore are not entitled to the same rights as an owner of 
a copy.102 
Timothy Vernor came into possession of copies of Autodesk‟s 
copyrighted software by purchasing these copies from Card-
well/Thomas & Associates, Inc. (“CTA”).  CTA had obtained these 
copies directly from Autodesk, accompanied by a software license 
agreement (“SLA”), which granted CTA a nontransferable license for 
the software and which imposed use and transfer restrictions on the 
use of the copy.103  For example, under the SLA, CTA was barred 
from “renting, leasing, or transferring the software without Auto-
desk‟s prior consent and from electronically or physically transferring 
the software out of the Western Hemisphere.”104  Nevertheless, CTA 
sold the used copies to Vernor in an office sale, accompanied by the 
license agreements, and Vernor proceeded to sell the copies on eBay 
where Autodesk discovered them.105 
The court considered the issue whether CTA and therefore 
Vernor were owners of the copies in their possession.106  If a “first 
sale” of the copies occurred when CTA purchased the license grant-
ing CTA rights under the copyright, then CTA was an owner of the 
copies and had a right to resell them to Vernor.107  A violation of any 
terms of the “license” barring him from doing so would be a breach 
 
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”); 17 U.S.C. § 202 (in-
dicating that ownership of the material object is separate from ownership of the copyright); 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a]. 
101 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2010); see 17 U.S.C. § 
109(a). 
102 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112; see id. at 1112 n.13 (“[T]he Copyright Act confers this [es-
sential step] defense only on owners of software copies. . . . [A] licensee‟s right to use the 
software . . . is conferred by the terms of its license agreement.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117)). 
103 Id. at 1103-04. 
104 Id. at 1104. 
105 Id. at 1104-05. 
106 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107. 
107 Id. 
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of contract rather than copyright infringement.108  On the other hand, 
if the copies were only provided to CTA for the purpose of exercising 
the rights licensed under the copyright, then CTA would not be con-
sidered an owner of copies, and any sale of the copies would infringe 
upon Autodesk‟s right of distribution.109 
The decision reconciled prior precedents and established a 
three-factor test to determine whether a software user is a licensee or 
an owner of the software copy.110  Similar to F.B.T. Productions, the 
court decided whether CTA and Vernor were owners of copies based 
on whether they were licensees.111  The court found that a software 
program user is a licensee (and therefore not an owner of a copy) 
when (1) the user is specifically granted a license by the copyright 
owner; (2) significant restrictions are placed on the user‟s ability to 
transfer the product; and (3) any other significant use restrictions ex-
ist.112  The court noted that copies of copyrighted software can only 
be licensed and rightfully possessed rather than owned, and therefore 
those in possession are not entitled to the same rights as owners of 
copies.113  Autodesk, as the copyright owner, retained title to the cop-
yright and imposed restrictions on the software user, leading the court 
to a finding that the software was licensed.114 
Significantly, the court did not determine whether there was a 
public distribution of authorized copies of the software, resulting in a 
 
108 Id. at 1107 n.6. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1110-11 (citing Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff‟s Dep‟t, 447 F.3d 
769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977)); see Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110 (“Citing MAI, we held 
[in Wall Data] that the essential step defense does not apply where the copyright owner 
grants the user a license and significantly restricts the user‟s ability to transfer the software.” 
(citing Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 773; MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511)); id. at 1109 (“[U]nder 
Wise, where a transferee receives a particular copy of a copyrighted work pursuant to a writ-
ten agreement . . . . [w]e may consider (1) whether the agreement was labeled a license and 
(2) whether the copyright owner retained title to the copy, required its return or destruction, 
forbade its duplication, or required the transferee to maintain possession of the copy for the 
agreement‟s duration.  We did not find any one factor dispositive . . . .” (citing Wise, 550 
F.2d at 1190-92)). 
111 See id. at 1107.  The court refers to the licensing of the copies, rather than licensing of 
the copyright, which again added to the confusion between the copy and the copyright.  See 
id.  This analysis will be further scrutinized below, following the discussion of UMG.  See 
text accompanying notes 142-159. 
112 Id. at 1110-11. 
113 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112. 
114 Id. at 1111. 
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transfer of ownership in those particular copies.115  The court instead 
found that, because the transaction satisfied the test for the licensing 
of the copyright, the particular copies could not have been owned and 
must have merely been possessed.116 
This analysis is problematic under the first sale doctrine and § 
202 of the Copyright Act.117  Once a particular copy has been public-
ly distributed for sale by the copyright owner, the copyright owner no 
longer has the right to control distribution of that copy.118  Although 
the distributor could request that the consumer agree to restrictions 
regarding distribution, such an agreement serves as a contractual re-
striction on the material object rather than a license for copyright.119  
In other words, a violation of any contractual agreement would only 
be a breach of contract, rather than copyright infringement.120  Simi-
larly, if the distribution were accompanied by a license for the copy-
right, that license would not be able to limit distribution because dis-
tribution is not an exclusive right of the copyright owner beyond the 
first sale.121  Consequently, a license for the copyright cannot limit 
the transfer of ownership, which can only be accomplished through a 
contractual agreement limiting an owner‟s use of the copy.122  Al-
though the court in Vernor acknowledged this breach of contract 
theory and the first sale doctrine as established in Bobbs-Merrill, it 
found that an express and restrictive license bars a finding of owner-
ship of particular copies, and stated, “Bobbs-Merrill did not and 
 
115 Ironically, the district court did hold that a first sale took place and therefore found that 
CTA and Vernor owned the copies of the software program, regardless of the licensing re-
strictions placed on the use of the copyright.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 
1164, 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2008).  The district court also found that the precedential cases 
were irreconcilable with respect to the effect of the license agreement, but nevertheless de-
termined that there was a transfer in ownership of the copies.  Id. at 1172.  Prior to the circuit 
court‟s reversal of this decision, it was cited by scholars who agreed that a first sale had tak-
en place.  See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i]. 
116 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. 
117 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 202. 
118 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908). 
119 See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6. 
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6. 
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 109; Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350. 
122 See 17 U.S.C. § 109; Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350.  If a contract limits a potential 
owner‟s right to exercise various ownership rights, such as resale of the copy, this may be 
indicative that a transfer of ownership did not take place, as is also the case with rentals.  See 
Nimmer, supra note 4, at 1312.  Even in this case, however, limitations placed upon the pos-
sessor as a potential owner of a copy, and not limitations placed upon the copyright, deter-
mine whether there was a transfer of ownership.  See id. 
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could not address the question of whether the right to use software is 
distinct from the ownership of copies of software.”123  This statement 
regarding Bobbs-Merrill furthers the contention that Vernor has con-
flated the distinction between the copy and the copyright. 
Finally, in UMG Recording, Inc. v. Augusto, despite certain 
licensing language on the labels, the court found that recipients of 
promotional CDs were owners of those copies and therefore could 
raise the first sale doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement af-
ter reselling the copies.124  Troy Augusto, an unintended recipient of 
promotional CDs who then sold his copies, alleged that he was pro-
tected by the first sale doctrine.125  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the de-
cision of the district court in favor of Augusto, but supported his 
ownership rights for different reasons.126 
The district court stated that, in order to be protected by the 
first sale defense, Augusto would have to prove: “(1) the CDs were 
lawfully manufactured with UMG‟s authorization; (2) UMG trans-
ferred title to the CDs; (3) Augusto was the lawful owner of the CDs; 
and (4) Augusto disposed of, but did not reproduce, the CDs.”127  
UMG disputed parts two and three of this standard – that it trans-
ferred title in the copies and that Augusto was the lawful owner of the 
CDs.128  The district court, on two separate grounds, found that UMG 
did transfer title in the copies and thus Augusto was the lawful own-
er.129  First, the court looked to the “economic realities of the transac-
tion,” noting that UMG‟s inability to regain possession coupled with 
the recipients‟ freedom from obligation to UMG was indicative of a 
sale.130  Second, the court found that the CDs were gifts under the 
federal Unordered Merchandise Statute, resulting in a transfer of title 
from UMG to the recipients.131 
 
123 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107, 1114 (citing Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. 339).  Cf. NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 3, at [B][1][d][i]. 
124 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011). 
125 Id. at 1179. 
126 Id. at 1182. 
127 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 
UMG, 628 F.3d at 1177. 
128 Id. at 1060. 
129 Id. at 1060, 1062. 
130 Id. at 1060. 
131 Id. at 1062 (“The Postal Reorganization Act prohibits „the mailing of unordered mer-
chandise‟ without „the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient.‟  This merchandise 
„may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or 
dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without obligation whatsoever to the sender.‟ ” (quot-
20
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The circuit court affirmed, but noted that its decision was 
based on “somewhat different grounds.”132  The court focused on the 
distribution method, finding that (1) the nature of UMG‟s distribution 
did not provide for sufficient control or monitoring of the use and 
transfer of the CDs by the recipients,133 and (2) UMG‟s mailing of the 
CDs without having received an order or request for the copies from 
the recipients fell within the Unordered Merchandise Statute, thereby 
allowing the recipients to use or dispose of the received copy as they 
saw fit.134  It criticized the district court for “rel[ying]” on UMG‟s in-
ability to regain possession of the copies.135  Citing Vernor, the court 
noted that an inability to regain possession was not conclusive evi-
dence of a sale.136  Rather, the court considered UMG‟s “means of 
distribution,” and found it indicative of a transfer of ownership of the 
copy because UMG‟s method left them with no control over the cop-
ies.137  The failure to regain possession was evidence of that lack of 
control, although it could not be used conclusively to show owner-
ship.138 
The circuit court‟s decision makes two important points.  
First, similar to Bobbs-Merrill, the court correctly found that there 
had been a transfer of ownership in the copies, distinct from any at-
tempted restrictions on the use of the copyright.139  However, the 
court claimed that the district court relied on the copyright owner‟s 
inability to regain possession, when in fact, the district court focused 
on the economic realities of the transaction, just as the circuit court 
relied on the means of distribution.140  Second, both courts looked to 
 
ing 39 U.S.C. § 3009)). 
132 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182. 
133 Id. at 1180, 1183. 
134 Id. at 1180-81 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009(a), (b)). 
135 Id. at 1182-83. 
136 Id. at 1183 (citing Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
137 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183. 
138 Id. 
139 Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908). 
140 See UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 
1062 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  The circuit court even used the same language as the district court 
by stating that a failure to return a product may be evidence that a copyright owner did not 
“retain „sufficient incidents of ownership . . . to be sensibly considered the owner of the cop-
ies.‟ ”  UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 
2005)).  Krause used this standard to determine ownership of a computer program copy, sub-
sequently noting that a formal transfer of title is not required for a finding of ownership.  
Krause, 402 F.3d at 124.  “The presence or absence of formal title may of course be a factor 
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the Unordered Merchandise Statute to find that there had been a 
transfer in ownership of the copies.141 
At first reading, the circuit court did not affirm the decision 
on different grounds.  However, it appeared to use the decision as an 
attempt to reconcile the UMG holding with its decision in Vernor just 
a few months earlier.  The district court in UMG looked to the four 
elements used to determine whether a first sale had occurred through 
a public distribution of authorized copies.
 142  Such an analysis did not 
take place in Vernor, nor did it take place in UMG‟s circuit court de-
cision.  The circuit court in UMG used a “means of distribution” 
analysis, whereas Vernor applied a three-part test, requiring the copy-
right owner to specify that the user is granted a license.143  The court 
in UMG found it permissible to use different standards because reci-
pients of promotional CDs were in a “very different position” from 
users of software programs.144  Software users “order and pay” for the 
copies transferred into their possession, while recipients of promo-
tional CDs receive unordered copies without agreeing to be bound by 
any terms of their use.145  In Vernor, the acceptance of the terms by 
the software user was undisputed.146  However, UMG failed to obtain 
such an agreement.147  It did not even have arrangements in place to 
 
in this inquiry, but the absence of formal title may be outweighed by evidence that the pos-
sessor of the copy enjoys sufficiently broad rights over it to be sensibly considered its own-
er.”  Id.  The court held in favor of the possessor of the copies, observing that the copyright 
owner allowed the possessor to “possess and use the programs forever” and thus did not “ex-
ercise[] sufficient incidents of ownership over [the] copy of the program to be sensibly con-
sidered the owner of the copy.”  Id. 
141 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180; UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. 
142 See UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1059; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 
8.12[B][1][a]. 
143 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (citing Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
144 Id. at 1183. 
145 Id. 
[S]oftware users . . . are in a very different position from that held by the 
recipients of UMG‟s promotional CDs. . . . UMG has virtually no control 
over the unordered CDs it issues because of its means of distribution, 
and it has no assurance that any recipient has assented or will assent to 
the creation of any license or accept its limitations. 
Id. 
146 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104-05 (“[C]ustomers must accept [the software license agree-
ment (“SLA”)] before installing the software.  A customer who does not accept the SLA can 
return the software for a full refund. . . . CTA agreed to the SLA.”). 
147 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182 & n.6.  UMG had stated in its promotional statement, “Accep-
tance of this CD shall constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license.”  Id.  
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track the recipients‟ use and transfer of the particular copies.148  Thus, 
UMG did not “retain „sufficient incidents of ownership‟ ” over the 
copies, as Autodesk had in Vernor through its accepted license 
agreement, in order to establish that ownership of the copies had not 
been transferred to the recipients.149 
The court in UMG further distinguished Vernor by applying 
the Unordered Merchandise Statute to the distribution of the promo-
tional CDs.150  The statute treats unordered merchandise as gifts and 
allows the recipients of such items to “retain, use, discard, or dispose 
of [them] in any manner [they] see fit without any obligation what-
soever to the sender.”151  Accordingly, the promotional CDs, which 
were mailed by UMG without being ordered by the recipients, quali-
fy as “unordered merchandise” and therefore establish the recipients 
as owners, granting them the right to do with the CDs as they wish.152 
Despite the Ninth Circuit‟s efforts to create a standard for de-
termining ownership, the court failed to enunciate a standard for a 
situation similar to one involving digital downloads.153  The court in 
UMG limited the standard set forth in Vernor to software users154 and 
emphasized the nature of UMG‟s distribution to support its conclu-
sion that those in possession of music recordings own the CDs.155  
The promotional distribution was distinguished from that of a soft-
ware program based on the distribution method, which lacked copy-
right owner control and involved an application of the Unordered 
Merchandise Statute.156  Although the UMG holding was not express-
 
The court noted that “acceptance” of a CD may in fact be able to constitute an agreement, 
however there was no evidence that the individual recipients “accept[ed]” the CD.  Id. at 
1182.  Silence or inaction following the receipt of an unsolicited offer does constitute an ac-
ceptance of the offer.  Id. at 1182 n.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 
cmts. a, c). 
148 Id. at 1180 (“[T]he promotional CDs are dispatched to the recipients without any prior 
arrangement as to those particular copies.  The CDs are not numbered, and no attempt is 
made to keep track of where particular copies are or what use is made of them.”). 
149 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (citing Krause, 402 F.3d at 124). 
150 Id. at 1180-81 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009(a), (b)).  “Th[e] effect of the Unordered Mer-
chandise Statute distinguishes this case from those involving computer software, where the 
software consumers clearly ordered and paid for the software licensed to them.”  Id. at 1181. 
151 Id. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 3009(b)). 
152 Id. at 1180-81 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3009(a), (b)). 
153 See infra Part III. 
154 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1183 (“This formulation . . . applies in terms to software users.”). 
155 Id. at 1180 (“Our conclusion that the recipients acquired ownership of the CDs is based 
largely on the nature of UMG‟s distribution.”). 
156 Id. at 1180-83. 
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ly limited to promotional CDs,157 the court in Vernor noted that the 
“economic realities of the transaction” (in other words, the method of 
the copies‟ distribution as used in UMG), were not dispositive of 
ownership of the copies.158  The court instead focused on the effect of 
the distribution on the copyright, rather than the effect on the object 
embodying it.159  Thus, the court left unresolved the applicable stan-
dard to resolve a claim in which a non-computer program copy, such 
as a music recording, is ordered and purchased, and the copyright 
owner asserts control over the transfer and use of the copies, such as 
ensuring the possessors‟ acceptance of a license agreement. 
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: THE EFFECT OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON DIGITAL DOWNLOADS 
A. If the Ninth Circuit’s Rule Applies, Consumers Do 
Not Own the Digital Downloads They Purchase 
Through Software Programs. 
The Ninth Circuit cases create two distinct categories, and 
digital downloads are a hybrid.  Vernor, according to UMG, applies 
to software cases only, and precludes a finding of ownership in the 
copy when parties have expressly entered into a license agreement for 
the copyright that imposes significant use and transfer restrictions on 
the copy.160  UMG uses a “means of distribution” standard instead of 
relying upon accompanying license agreements in cases where, such 
as with promotional CDs, the copyright owner lacks some level of 
 
157 All statements of the holding refer to the nature, means, method, or circumstances of 
the distribution of promotional CDs, finding that the copies of CDs transferred ownership 
because of the means of distribution.  See id. at 1183 (“UMG‟s distribution of the promo-
tional CDs under the circumstances effected a sale (transfer of title) of the CDs to the reci-
pients.”) (emphasis added).  See also id. at 1180 (“We conclude that, under all the circums-
tances of the CDs‟ distribution, the recipients were entitled to use or dispose of them in any 
manner they saw fit, and UMG did not enter a license agreement for the CDs with the reci-
pients.”); UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182 (“[W]e conclude that UMG‟s transfer of possession to the 
recipients, without meaningful control or even knowledge of the status of the CDs after 
shipment, accomplished a transfer of title.”); id. at 1183 (“[W]e conclude that UMG‟s me-
thod of distribution transferred the ownership of the copies to the recipients . . . .”). 
158 Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010).  Cf. Jim Graves, Who Owns 
a Copy?, 2 CYBARIS 45, 70 (2011) (arguing that the “economic realities” test would be a 
more suitable test than the one used by the circuit court in Vernor). 
159 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. 
160 See id. at 1110-11. 
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control over the distribution of the CDs or enforcement of the pur-
ported license agreement.161  On the other hand, the court in F.B.T. 
Productions required, for the finding of a license, a transfer of the 
copy‟s possession, retention of ownership in the copyright, and re-
strictions on use of the copy, although it did not limit this standard to 
a particular good.162 
Digital downloads have qualities of the copies and distribu-
tion methods found in each of these Ninth Circuit cases, making it 
difficult to determine which standard to use for the purpose of defin-
ing ownership of copies.  First, downloads of music recordings are 
copies, similar to the CDs transferred in UMG.163  A download is the 
transmission from an online server to a local hard drive of an elec-
tronic file which contains a copy of the digital form of a work.164  
This digital file cannot be opened, and in the case of music, listened 
to, until after the file has been transmitted and saved on the user‟s 
hard drive.165 
At that point, however, the file must be opened using a com-
patible software program, also known as an online music store.166  
This makes the transfer more like the situation in Vernor, because the 
use of the software program requires the consumer to sign a software 
license agreement.167  These software agreements typically require 
that the consumer update the program upon the release of the latest 
software, ensuring the distributor‟s constant contact with the user of 
the program, as well as that consumer‟s compliance with the license 
agreement.168  Additionally, due to the risks of piracy and copyright 
 
161 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1182-83. 
162 F.B.T. Prod., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010).  Argua-
bly, F.B.T. Productions, similar to Vernor, was incorrectly decided because it did not deter-
mine ownership of the copy as distinct from licensing of the copyright.  Id.  This distinction 
was most closely realized in UMG, but the court failed to fully address it by not affirming 
that part of the district court decision.  See UMG, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1059. 
163 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E]. 
164 United States v. A.S.C.A.P., 627 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-1337, 
2011 WL 4536526 (Oct. 3, 2011). 
165 Id. at 71. 
166 Id.; see In re Apple, No. C 05-00037 JW, 2010 WL 2629907, at *4; Purchasing Music, 
iTunes Store Category listed on iTunes A to Z, supra note 4. 
167 See Software License Agreement for iTunes, supra note 4; iTunes Store Terms and 
Conditions, supra note 4. 
168 See In re Apple, 2010 WL 2629907, at *4.  Arguably, distributors like Apple also use 
these software updates to maintain their alleged monopoly over audio downloads and digital 
media players.  See id. 
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infringement involving digital media,169 the transferred copies are of-
ten encrypted with technological security measures called digital 
rights management, or “DRM,” which further increases the amount 
of control the copyright owner retains over the copies.170 
F.B.T. Productions involved copies of music recordings, such 
as digital downloads; however, the court still found, due to the re-
strictions placed on the use of the copy by the licensing provision, the 
possessor of the copies was a licensee rather than the owner of the 
copies.171  The court focused on the language of the agreement, which 
it was unable to do in UMG because the CD recipients never accepted 
the purported license.172  In this respect, the acquisition of a digital 
 
169 A copyrighted work in its digital format can be identically reproduced and copied 
through downloads without owning a physical copy.  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928-29 (2005) (discussing the popularity of file-sharing 
and noting that “every copy [in digital distribution] is identical to the original . . . .”).  As 
digital downloads grow in popularity due to the increase in quality and convenience at a de-
creased cost, the risk of piracy and copyright infringement increases.  Richard Raysman & 
Peter Brown, Digital Rights Managing, Content Identifying Via Hi-Tech, 240 N.Y.L.J. 3, 3 
(2008) (“[W]ith the emergence of new technologies that allow manipulation of media, con-
tent owners have had diminished control over downstream users and consumers.”); see 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929 (imposing indirect liability on a software company due to “the 
number of infringing downloads that occur every day using [the] software”); Maverick Re-
cording v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2010) (collecting circuit court cases support-
ing the district court‟s ruling that the defendant directly infringed upon plaintiff‟s copyright 
by downloading audio files), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010); A&M Record, Inc. v. Nap-
ster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[Defendant‟s peer to peer file sharing pro-
gram] has adverse effects on the developing digital download market.”). 
170 See Raysman & Brown, supra note 169. 
[D]igital rights management is a generic term referring to a variety of 
technologies to prevent or minimize the unauthorized distribution, copy-
ing or access to copyrighted materials. . . . The goals of DRM are multi-
faceted: to prevent widespread, unauthorized distribution and piracy; fa-
cilitate adoption of legitimate digital content delivery methods; and per-
haps enable enhanced commercialization of content displayed in new 
technological formats. 
Id.  The use of these measures is enforced by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA).  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006); MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer and In-
dus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2010) (“One of Congress‟ purposes behind enacting 
the DMCA was targeting the circumvention of technological protections.”).  There are many 
forms of DRM, each having varying security levels.  For example, some files are formatted 
so that they are only compatible with the distributor‟s media players.  See In re Apple, 2010 
WL 2629907, at *4.  Other forms include “content identification technology” such as “wa-
termarks and [digital] fingerprints,” encryption technology such as CSS technology, and 
product activation.  Raysman & Brown, supra note 169; see also Matt Williams, Fending 
Off Hackers, NAT‟L L.J. (Nov. 3, 2008), available at LAW.COM (discussing forms of DRM). 
171 F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010). 
172 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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download is more like F.B.T. Productions because of the software 
agreement between the parties. 
This begs the question: because a digital download is a copy 
of a music recording but requires the use of software and consequent-
ly an agreement to the software license terms, do consumers own the 
copies they purchase as in UMG, or do they license them from the 
copyright owners as in F.B.T. Productions and Vernor?  The Ninth 
Circuit cases leave a gap in their decisions for finding a standard to 
use for copyrighted works in the form of digital downloads.  As 
noted, digital downloads and the circumstances surrounding their dis-
tribution contain similarities with each of the cases, but do not fit per-
fectly with any of them. 
The court in UMG limited the standard used in its Vernor de-
cision to software.173  Digital downloads themselves are not software 
programs, although software programs are often required.  UMG, 
which applied to copies of music recordings rather than software, 
found ownership of the copies by relying on the level of control re-
tained by the copyright owner through the means of distribution ra-
ther than the language of the purported license.174  Although digital 
downloads are copies of music recordings, the copyright owners re-
tain a high level of control over these copies, and therefore UMG’s 
distinction of software fails when applied to digital downloads.  Like 
the software users in Vernor, digital download consumers are re-
quired to accept license agreements, are entitled to software updates, 
and are subjected to some form of DRM.175  Finally, in F.B.T. Pro-
ductions, also a music recording case, the court found that the rele-
vant copies were licensed rather than sold, relying on the language in 
the parties‟ agreement.176 
Applying these various cases to digital downloads, a distinc-
tion must be made between the required software, such as iTunes, 
and the copies being purchased through the required software.  If this 
 
173 Id.; see Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2010). 
174 UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180.  The distribution methods used in Vernor and UMG were also 
distinguishable under the Unordered Merchandise Statute.  See id. at 1180-81.  However, the 
court in UMG did not simply find a “first sale” as a result of this statute (which it likely 
could have), and therefore, the remainder of this section will focus on the rest of the court‟s 
rationale – the means of distribution and lack of control.  See id. at 1180-83. 
175 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1103-05; see Software License Agreement for iTunes, supra note 
4; iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 4; supra note 170 (discussing types of dig-
ital rights management). 
176 F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964. 
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distinction were maintained, the license agreement would apply only 
to the software program, and a court would be able to find a “first 
sale” of the downloads just as if the consumer had purchased them 
from the local music store.  However, this distinction is often not 
maintained.  The “software” license agreements for these music store 
programs lay out the terms of use for any digital content purchased 
through the product.177  Additionally, the agreements do not necessar-
ily grant express ownership of the copy to the consumer.178  Although 
the terms often refer to a purchase of the copies, the Ninth Circuit has 
indicated that an accepted and restrictive license agreement is evi-
dence that a transfer of ownership has not occurred, therefore making 
the first sale doctrine inapplicable.179 
Despite consumers‟ belief that they own authorized digital 
downloads just as they have owned their CDs and cassettes,180 it 
seems that under this new Ninth Circuit standard, consumers are li-
censees of digital downloads rather than owners of copies.  In UMG, 
the rationale used by the court to distinguish Vernor and the software 
 
177 See iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 4 (“You agree that the Service and 
certain Products include security technology that limits your use of Products and that . . . you 
shall use Products in compliance with the applicable usage rules established by Apple and its 
licensors. . . . [Apple] reserve[s] the right to change, suspend, remove, or disable access to 
any Products [or] content.”); Software License Agreement for iTunes, supra note 4; Amazon 
MP3 Music Service: Terms of Use, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/dmusic/help/ 
amd.html/ref=sv_dmusic_6 (follow “terms of use” link) (last updated Oct. 5, 2010) (“[W]e 
grant you a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to use the Digital Content for your person-
al, non-commercial, entertainment use, subject to and in accordance with the Terms of 
Use.”); supra note 170 (discussing types of digital rights management); see also Raburn, su-
pra note 4, at 47-49 (discussing the Terms of Use and DRM used for the Amazon Kindle). 
178 See iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 4.  Apple refers to its consumers as 
end users who purchase digital content which is subject to the terms and conditions agree-
ment.  Id.  The Terms also refer to the transaction as a “sale,” and state that “title for all elec-
tronically delivered transactions pass to the purchaser . . . upon electronic transmission to the 
recipient.”  Id.  However, as demonstrated by F.B.T. and UMG, these formal titles are not 
dispositive of a particular transaction.  See UMG, 628 F.3d at 1180 (holding that the transfers 
of possession resulted in ownership of the copies despite the licensing notice); F.B.T. Prods., 
621 F.3d at 964 (holding that, despite the lack of express licensing language, the parties‟ 
agreement constituted a license). 
179 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-11; F.B.T. Prods., 621 F.3d at 964-65. 
180 The copyright owner‟s public distribution of authorized copies, even in the form of 
digitally downloaded copies, should trigger the first sale doctrine just as it does for the phys-
ical hardcopy versions.  See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1106 (asserting that Vernor owned the pur-
chased, authentic copies in his possession).  Many consumers do not immediately notice the 
difference in their title because, although copyright owners and distributors retain a high lev-
el of control over the copies, they allow consumers extra freedoms that the consumers would 
have expected had they owned the copies.  See Purchasing Music, iTunes Store Category 
listed on iTunes A to Z, supra note 4. 
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cases is limited in applicability to distinguishing the promotional CD 
distribution method; the distinction between software and CDs fails 
when applied to digital downloads because the copyright owners re-
tain a substantial amount of control over the digital copies.181  Addi-
tionally, because this high level of control is partially in the form of a 
software program with an accompanying license agreement which in-
cludes terms regarding the use of the copies, it seems that under 
F.B.T. and arguably under Vernor as well, digital downloads are dis-
tributed in the form of licenses.  Consequently, this means that there 
is no “first sale” of the download due to the restrictive licensing 
terms, and therefore a consumer cannot act pursuant to the first sale 
doctrine without permission under the license. 
B. If Consumers Owned Digital Downloads, Their 
Ownership Rights Could Not Be Exercised When 
the Copies are Subject to License Agreements and 
DRM 
Arguably, the Ninth Circuit‟s decisions in Vernor and F.B.T. 
Productions are incorrect when viewed in light of §§ 109 and 202, 
and the decision in UMG, although correct when it was based on the 
Unordered Merchandise Statute, is wrongly decided when based on 
the means of distribution theory.  Ownership of the copy, which per-
mits the use of the first sale defense, is not a determination that 
should be based on the copyright owner‟s control over its copyright; 
the two aspects are statutorily distinct.182 
For example, if the first sale doctrine were to be strictly ap-
plied to Vernor, then there would have been a first sale based on the 
following analysis183: (1) The copies were lawfully manufactured be-
cause the copyright owner made them; (2) The physical copies were 
lawfully transferred with Autodesk‟s authorization to CTA; (3) The 
physical copies were owned by,184 rather than leased or rented to, 
 
181 See supra note 177 (providing language from both Apple and Amazon‟s license 
agreements and terms and conditions). 
182 17 U.S.C. § 202; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i]. 
183 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (stating that, even with re-
spect to licenses, “the first sale inquiry examines ownership of the tangible property in which 
the copyrighted work has been embodied, not ownership of the copyright itself,” yet noting 
that many courts have wrongly interpreted this). 
184 For purposes of this analysis, “ownership” is assumed under a traditional approach, 
prior to any analysis under Vernor, which stated that there would be no ownership where 
there is a restrictive license.  Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1116. 
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CTA (assuming there were no restrictions imposed on the copyright 
affecting use of the copy); and (4) CTA disposed of the copies by 
selling them to Vernor.185  Because all four elements were satisfied, 
there would have been a first sale of the copy, the material object 
embodying the copyright; the copyright owner publicly distributed 
the particular authorized copies into the stream of commerce thus ex-
hausting his exclusive distribution right.186  Notably, the use of the 
copyrighted work is still restricted by any agreements to the extent 
that any exist; however, if consumers were not considered the owners 
of their copies, they would be unable to simply sell or dispose of the 
products when they want to rid themselves of them.187 
Assume, then, that consumers of digital downloads are in fact 
owners of the copies in their possession.  Under the first sale doc-
trine, this only gives them the right to sell, lend, or dispose of their 
copy.188  Copies of digital downloads are presumably stored on the 
consumers‟ hard drives, which limits the consumers to the sale of the 
machine on which the file was downloaded.189  The consumers, as 
owners of copies, may only assert the first sale doctrine as an affir-
mative defense with respect to the transfer of the copies, but not with 
respect to any reproduction necessary to do so.190  Reproduction of 
the copy, which would be required in order to transfer the digital 
download, would infringe upon the copyright owners‟ exclusive 
right.191 
 
185 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[B][1][a] (illustrating the same test); id. 
at § 8.12[B][1][d][i] (supporting the district court‟s decision in Vernor prior to the circuit 
court‟s ruling which reversed the applicability of the first sale doctrine). 
186 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‟anza Research Int‟l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998)). 
187 See Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010); Nimmer, supra note 4, 
at 1312 (discussing the relationship between contract principles and transfers of ownership). 
188 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
189 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E] (indicating that one qualifies as a 
lawful owner of a copy by owning the machine on which it is stored, because it is the ma-
chine‟s RAM or hard drive which contains the copy). 
190 Id. at § 8.12[D]. 
191 17 U.S.C. § 106; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E] 
Consider the consequences of Amalyah, who holds a copy of her favorite 
copyrighted work (be it musical recording, motion picture, novel, or oth-
er) in RAM, sending it to Benjamin‟s PC, who uploads it to Cindy, who 
transmits it to Dharmuta‟s hard drive. . . . [T]he copyright owner whose 
work traverses the Amalyah--Dharmuta chain has suffered trespass on its 
“right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.” 
Id. 
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Accordingly, it would seem as though, simply by the nature of 
digital downloads, licenses would be necessary in order for consum-
ers to use copies in the way that they would have used CDs or cas-
settes.  A CD can easily be moved from one location to another and 
played from different players without infringing upon the exclusive 
rights of the copyright owner.192  A digital file, however, requires the 
file to be copied in order to play it on different machines, such as 
another computer or a portable player.193  Absent licenses allowing 
such reproduction and absent an application of the essential step de-
fense, consumers would have to sell their entire hard drive if they 
wanted to sell or share their music collection.194 
If a license to the copyright was in fact granted along with a 
transfer of ownership in the copies, the current Ninth Circuit would 
simply call this a license and the owner of the copies would no longer 
be deemed an owner.195  However, even if a court considered the pos-
sessor both an owner and a licensee, as permissible under § 202, it is 
possible that the owner of the copies would not be able to exercise 
ownership rights.  The license at issue would likely serve to grant 
rights under the copyright, such as reproduction, as well as contrac-
tually restrict some nonexclusive rights, such as resale and private 
use of the copy.196 
 
192 This statement is limited to the playing of CDs in stereo systems or on computers 
without compressing the discs into an MP3 file. 
Digital MP3 files are created through a process colloquially called “rip-
ping.”  Ripping software allows a computer owner to copy an audio 
compact disk (“audio CD”) directly onto a computer‟s hard drive by 
compressing the audio information on the CD into the MP3 format.  The 
MP3‟s compressed format allows for rapid transmission of digital audio 
files from one computer to another by electronic mail or any other file 
transfer protocol. 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).  This compression 
is actually a violation of the copyright owner‟s exclusive right to reproduction.  See Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Sydney Aaron Beckman, 
From CD to MP3: Compression in the New Age of Technology Overlooked Infringement or 
Fair Use?, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 469, 476 (2007) (discussing Apple‟s part in encouraging this 
alleged infringement). 
193 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E].  The copyright owner could further 
include DRMs to ensure compliance with the agreement.  See supra note 169. 
194 See supra note 191; infra Part IV(A) (discussing proposed changes to the essential step 
defense). 
195 See Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010); F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. 
Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010). 
196 This is precisely what the agreement in Vernor did.  Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104.  The 
court found these contractual restrictions to be indicative of a copyright license and wrongly 
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Although not an infringement of the copyright, consumers 
may still be unable to use the digital downloads as they would CDs or 
cassettes due to the restrictions placed on them by the contractual 
agreement.  If consumers tried to sell their downloads, which they 
would be entitled to do under the first sale doctrine, they may be 
found in breach of contract for violating the terms of the agree-
ment.197  Consequently, the rights belonging to possessors of copies 
are limited, regardless of whether they are owners or licensees. 
V. AMENDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT: PROTECTING THE 
RIGHTS OF OWNERS OF COPIES 
Commentators are currently debating whether a digital first 
sale doctrine exists under the current Copyright Act.  Many believe, 
as found above,198 that § 109 already applies to digital media, al-
though its usefulness is limited without permission to reproduce.199  
Thus, the most effective way to protect both the rights of owners of 
authorized digital copies while continuing to protect the copyright 
owners from piracy and infringement may be to amend the Copyright 
Act.200 
A. Amending The Essential Step Defense 
Congress considered amending the Act with respect to the 
rights belonging to owners of copies when it enacted the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”).201  While the first sale 
 
barred ownership of the copy.  Id. at 1111.  With respect to digital downloads, most contrac-
tual agreements are in the form of “click-through agreements” and cannot be negotiated.  
See, e.g., agreements cited supra note 4 (appearing in the form of a “click-through agree-
ment” when first presented to the consumer). 
197 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 n.6 (“If Autodesk‟s transfer of [the software] copies to 
CTA was a first sale, then CTA‟s resale of the software in violation of the SLA‟s terms 
would be a breach of contract, but would not result in copyright liability.” (citing United 
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977))). 
198 See supra Part III(A). 
199 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E]. 
200 See id. 
201 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 104(a)(2), 112 Stat. 2860 
(Note, 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117) (1998) (“The Register of Copyrights and the Assistant Secre-
tary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce shall jointly eva-
luate--(1) the effects of the amendments made by this title and the development of electronic 
commerce and associated technology on the operation of sections 109 and 117 of title 17, 
United States Code; and (2) the relationship between existing and emergent technology and 
the operation of sections 109 and 117 of title 17, United States Code.”).  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 
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doctrine can be used to limit the copyright owner‟s right to distribu-
tion, the “essential step defense” limits the exclusive right to repro-
duction.202  The essential step defense states that the copying of a co-
pyrighted software program by the owner of a copy is not 
infringement if the copy is “created as an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and . . . 
is used in no other manner.”203  Similar to the first sale doctrine, the 
essential step defense requires ownership of the particular copy.204  
However, this defense is limited in applicability to software and is 
therefore of little use to owners of digital music downloads.205  Sig-
nificantly, Congress did not elect to amend the defense‟s unnecessary 
limitation to software after it enacted the DMCA.206 
As noted with respect to the first sale doctrine, the tests used 
by the Ninth Circuit to determine ownership often result in a finding 
against first sales and thereby prevent use of owners‟ affirmative de-
fenses when they should otherwise be allowed.  Consequently, if a 
court finds that a consumer does not own the copies of a software 
program, the user is barred from protection under the essential step 
defense.207  Absent terms in the license stating otherwise,208 the con-
sumer would be unable, for example, to copy the program from the 
purchased disc to a computer or back up a downloaded software pro-
gram for purposes of archiving without infringing the copyright.209  
The court in Vernor acknowledged the difficulty in limiting the use 
of this defense to owners, but noted that, based on the specific lan-
guage of the statute, it was Congress‟s intent to do so210: 
 
109, 117, 1201; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 8.12[E]. 
202 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 (“The exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale 
doctrine . . . . The exclusive reproduction right is limited within the software context by the 
essential step defense . . . .”); see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109, 117. 
203 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) construed by Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109; see also Krause v. Title-
serv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that, because the possessor of the 
software copy exercised “sufficient incidents of ownership” to be considered the owner of 
the copy, the use and modification of the software was protected by the essential step de-
fense). 
204 17 U.S.C. § 117; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107 (restricting this defense to use by owners of 
copies). 
205 17 U.S.C. § 117; Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107. 
206 See 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
207 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112. 
208 Id. at 1112 n.13. 
209 See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a). 
210 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112 & n.13 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)). 
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It may seem intuitive that every lawful user of a copy-
righted software program, whether they own their cop-
ies or are merely licensed to use them, should be en-
titled to an “essential step defense” that provides that 
they do not infringe simply by using a computer pro-
gram that they lawful acquired.  However, . . . a licen-
see‟s right to use the software, including the right to 
copy the software into RAM, is conferred by the terms 
of its license agreement.211 
In other words, the court assumes that the copyright owner 
will grant to the consumer all rights that are “essential” to the utiliza-
tion of the program, such as reproduction, just as the consumer would 
have received under the essential step defense.212  If this were in fact 
true, however, there would be no need for the essential step defense; 
Congress could abandon this section of the Act and depend on copy-
right owners to voluntarily give all consumers the rights necessary to 
use the copyrighted work.  Instead, however, Congress found a need 
to guarantee reproduction rights to owners of software copies when 
such reproduction was essential, but has failed to grant similar pro-
tection to other classes of owners.213 
The essential step defense was created as part of the Copy-
right Act of 1976 and has seen no major changes since.214  Now, in a 
world of digital media where there is only a thin line between the 
copy and the copyright, courts are simply ignoring the distinction, 
failing to find a first sale and ownership of copies, and therefore de-
nying consumers the ability to raise defenses such as the essential 
step defense.215  Additionally, digital music downloads are being dis-
tributed through and controlled by software programs.  For this rea-
son, the essential step defense should apply equally to software pro-
grams and digital content, such as music downloads, so that 
consumers do not need to rely on contractual agreements from the 
copyright owners in order to be granted these “essential” rights.  Of 
course, such a protection for consumers of digital downloads would 
 
211 Id. at 1112 n.13. 
212 Id. 
213 See 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
214 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 302, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998).  In 1998, subdivisions (c) and (d) were added, and titles were given to subdivisions 
(a) and (b).  See id. 
215 See, e.g., Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-11. 
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only be effective if courts return to a strict application of §§ 202 and 
109, finding ownership of the copy when there has been an autho-
rized distribution.216 
B. Amending the Fair Use Doctrine 
Another potential source of protection for consumers comes 
from the fair use doctrine.217  The fair use doctrine, like the first sale 
doctrine and the essential step defense, serves “as an exception to the 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder,” and thus fair use of the 
copyright would not be an infringing use.218  It allows the public to 
freely use a copyrighted work for purposes of “criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research,” “including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords.”219  Courts have 
found that these uses “afford[] considerable „latitude for scholarship 
and comment‟ ” as well as for parody.220  However, as previously 
stated, a licensee‟s rights are expressly limited by the terms of the li-
censing agreement and, as a result, there may be greater difficulty 
proving fair use.221  Notably, the fair use defense is not limited to 
those with ownership of a copy; one who is a licensee or merely in 
possession of the copy without owning it may raise this defense.222  
Thus, regardless of the future of the Ninth Circuit decision regarding 
the ownership of digitally downloaded copies, consumers will still be 
 
216 If courts continue to find, as the Ninth Circuit has, that copyrighted works embodied in 
digital forms cannot be sold but instead are licensed, the essential step defense will be inap-
plicable even to the software users it was written to protect, furthering the need to amend the 
Act. 
217 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; supra note 37. 
218 17 U.S.C. § 107; Sony BMG Music Entm‟t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d. 217, 229 
(D. Mass. 2009). 
219 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
220 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994)). 
221 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(acknowledging the existence of a “contractual waiver of affirmative defenses” (citing Unit-
ed States v. Spector, 55 F.3d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1995))). 
222 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2001).  
The court held that users of the Napster software program “who upload[ed] file names to the 
search index for others to copy violate[d] plaintiffs‟ distribution rights[ and] Napster users 
who download[ed] files containing copyrighted music violate[d] plaintiffs‟ reproduction 
rights.”  Id. at 1014.  Although these users possessed unauthorized copies, Napster asserted 
that those users were fair users – a defense which was ultimately rejected by the court.  Id. at 
1014-15. 
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able to assert a fair use defense, although they may be restricted if 
there is a license accompanying the transaction.223 
This determination is made by evaluating four factors laid out 
by Congress, weighing the results together, and viewing them in light 
of the purposes of copyright.224  These factors include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.225 
Although fair use protects digital download consumers re-
gardless of whether they own or merely possess the copies, courts 
have already made clear that certain uses of digital downloads, such 
as unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing, constitute copyright in-
fringement and are not excepted by the fair use doctrine.226  In A&M 
Records v. Napster, Inc.,227 the defendant software company asserted 
that the consumers‟ use of the copyrighted works, accessed through 
the Napster software, was “fair” and therefore non-infringing.228  
Napster argued that it could not be held liable as secondary infringers 
absent a direct infringer.229  The court had little difficulty finding that 
“Napster does not facilitate infringement of the copyright laws in the 
absence of direct infringement,”230 or that the acts of reproduction 
and distribution by the software users constituted copyright infringe-
 
223 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1983) 
(holding that consumers‟ use of Sony‟s VCRs was fair where the VCR enabled consumers to 
record television shows that were licensed for broadcast). 
224 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-77 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
225 17 U.S.C. § 107; see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
226 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).  
The Court in Grokster determined that there was no evidence of fair use by users of Grok-
ster‟s or StreamCast‟s software.  Id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  See also Napster, 239 
F.3d at 1014-15 (stating that Napster‟s peer-to-peer software does not fit within fair use). 
227 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
228 Id. at 1014 (“Napster asserts an affirmative defense to the charge that its users directly 
infringe plaintiffs‟ copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings.”). 
229 Id. at 1013 n.2. 
230 Id. (“Secondary liability for copyright infringement does not exist in the absence of 
direct infringement by a third party.”). 
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ment.231  Thus, the court was left to determine whether the use by 
Napster‟s consumers was fair, and it did so by addressing each of the 
four factors available in § 107.232 
The first element, purpose and character of the use, examines 
whether the work is “transformative,” as well as whether the work is 
“commercial or noncommercial.”233  Digital downloads were found 
to be non-transformative, as they were merely retransmitted copies of 
the work in a different medium.234  A transformative use is more like-
ly to be fair.235  Moreover, a noncommercial use weighs more to-
wards a finding of fair use, although it is not dispositive.236  A finding 
of commercial use, or “repeated and exploitative copying of copy-
righted works,” does not require the sale of copies for profit, nor does 
it require direct economic benefit to the owner of the copies.237  In 
Napster, the court found that the digital downloads were being used 
for commercial purposes because users would download the work to 
spare the expense of purchasing authorized copies.238 
The second element of fair use is the nature of the use.239  In 
other words, “[w]orks that are creative in nature are „closer to the 
core of intended copyright protection‟ than [the] more fact-based 
works.”240  The fact that the musical compositions and the sound re-
cordings were “creative” worked against the defendant in its fair use 
defense.241 
The third element reflects an analysis used to determine how 
much of the copyrighted work was used.242  By engaging in            
the “ „wholesale copying‟ of copyrighted work,” Napster users helped 
 
231 Id. at 1014 (“We agree that plaintiffs have shown that Napster users infringe at least 
two of the copyright holders‟ exclusive rights: the rights to reproduction, § 106(1); and dis-
tribution, § 106(3).  Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to 
copy violate the plaintiffs‟ distribution rights.  Napster users who download files containing 
copyrighted music violate plaintiffs‟ reproduction rights.”). 
232 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-15 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107). 




236 Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85). 
237 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015. 
238 Id. 
239 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
240 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
586 (1994)). 
241 Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586). 
242 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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to weigh the evidence against fair use for the digital downloads.243 
Finally, the court in Napster evaluated the effect of the use on 
the market244 and found that Napster harmed the market in two 
ways.245  First, downloaders were able to permissibly download, re-
sulting in a reduction of audio CD sales.246  Second, the use of Nap-
ster‟s software raised copyright owners‟ barriers of entry into the 
market of digital downloads, because consumers had the unautho-
rized Napster software as an option.247  Based on this negative effect 
on the market, in combination with the court‟s prior analysis under 
the fair use factor, the use of digital downloads in Napster did not fall 
within fair use.248 
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster249 that software distributors could be held li-
able for indirect infringement based on the infringing acts of its users, 
implicitly finding that file sharing constitutes copyright infringe-
ment.250  First, the Court distinguished this case from Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,251 in which Sony was held 
not liable for indirect infringement based on its distribution of the 
VCR.252  In Sony, evidence revealed that the VCR was primarily used 
for “ „time-shifting,‟ . . . which the Court found to be a fair, not an in-
fringing, use.”253  Second, the Court noted the district court‟s holding 
that “those who used the Grokster and Morpheus software to down-
load copyrighted media files directly infringed MGM‟s copyrights,” 
which was not disputed on appeal.254  Although the indirect infring-
ers, rather than the direct infringers, were actually held liable, this 
was likely based on the difficulty and impracticality of tracking down 
 
243 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016 (“While „wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per 
se,‟ copying an entire work „militates against a finding of fair use.‟ ” (quoting Worldwide 
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
244 Id. at 1016-17. 
245 Id. at 1016. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-18; see also Maverick Recording v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 
197, 199 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding a teenager directly liable for peer-to-peer file sharing after 
downloading various unauthorized sound recordings). 
249 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
250 See id. at 929-30. 
251 464 U.S. 417 (1983). 
252 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931-32 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442). 
253 Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 423-24). 
254 Id. at 927. 
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the direct infringers.255 
Some courts have encouraged owners of copies to look to the 
fair use doctrine, stating that courts should begin to interpret it more 
broadly.  In Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum,256 the 
court stated that “file sharing for the purposes of sampling music 
prior to purchase or space-shifting to store purchased music more ef-
ficiently might offer a compelling case for fair use.”257  Ultimately, 
however, the court held against a fair use finding, because the defen-
dant “mounted a broadside attack that would excuse all file sharing 
for private enjoyment.  It is a version of fair use so broad that it 
would swallow the copyright protections that Congress created, defy-
ing both statute and precedent.”258  Evidently, this court may have 
been willing to accept that some uses of digital downloads constitute 
fair use albeit not all uses. 
Based on these decisions and the four factors described above, 
it is possible to distinguish illegal file sharing from the sharing of au-
thorized copies, potentially allowing for protection of authorized cop-
ies under the fair use doctrine.  The court in Napster held that peer-
to-peer file sharing was a commercial use because users of the soft-
ware were downloading music to avoid the cost of purchasing autho-
rized copies.259  Conversely, when consumers purchase copies from 
online stores such as iTunes, they are purchasing authorized copies 
from authorized distributors.  Consumers must be able to copy these 
files onto their own computers or media players to listen to the music 
anywhere besides the machine on which the file was downloaded, 
just as they would move a single CD or cassette to multiple players.  
Arguably, use of one purchased copy in this way is noncommercial 
and does not affect sales, despite its requiring reproduction of the 
copy.  Just as consumers would not buy separate CDs for their cars, 
 
255 Id. at 929-30. 
256 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009). 
257 Id. at 220-21. 
258 Id. at 221. 
259 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).  The court 
also found that the sharing of digital downloads was not transformative, which is supported 
by holdings which find that CDs compressed to MP3 files, despite the change in format, are 
also non-transformative.  See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003).  
However, a finding that a work is transformative is not required to hold that the use is pro-
tected by the fair use doctrine.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994) (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair 
use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the crea-
tion of transformative works.”). 
39
Lahm: Buying a Digital Download ?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
250 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
computers, and every stereo in their homes, digital download con-
sumers should not be required to do the same, nor should they be re-
quired to rely on agreements from the distributors for such permis-
sion.  When the sharing of authorized digital downloads is analyzed 
under the four factors of fair use, two of the four factors are satisfied, 
while none of the factors were satisfied with respect to illegal file 
sharing.260  Therefore, courts should examine the fair use doctrine 
more broadly with respect to digital downloads, or the legislature 
should amend the fair use doctrine to draw a clearer distinction be-
tween illegal uses and authorized uses. 
C. Amending the DMCA Based on Fair Use 
Other proponents of fair use have tried to argue, with little 
success, that the DMCA is not intended to prohibit fair use, and 
therefore, circumvention is permitted for such fair use purposes.261  In 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,262 the defendant, Corley, was 
unsuccessful in raising a similar claim to prevent being enjoined from 
posting a copy of a DVD decryption program on his website.263  He 
argued that the DMCA provides that it shall not limit rights under fair 
use, which should be interpreted to “allow the circumvention of en-
cryption technology protecting copyrighted material” so long as the 
material “will be put to „fair uses.‟ ”264  Further, Corley asserted that 
an owner of a copy has the authorization from the copyright owner to 
access the work, or, in the case of a DVD, to view it.265  Thus, when 
the buyer is the one circumventing the encryption technology on the 
disc, he is doing so simply to view it using a different DVD player.266 
The court immediately rebutted both arguments.267  With re-
spect to the first defense, the court stated that § 1201(c)(1) “simply 
clarifies that the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls 
guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention 
tools), but does not concern itself with the use of those materials after 
 
260 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. 
261 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing 17 
U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)). 
262 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
263 Id. at 436, 459-60. 
264 Id. at 443. 
265 Id. at 444. 
266 Id. 
267 Corley, 273 F.3d at 443 & n.13. 
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circumvention has occurred.”268  In other words, the DMCA is li-
mited in scope in terms of what it aims to prevent, and thus, by its 
very definition, does not interfere with fair use.269  With respect to the 
defendant‟s second argument, the court noted that, regardless of 
whether a copyright holder granted authority to use, view, or listen to 
a work, such authority does not inherently imply authority to circum-
vent any encryptions.270  Rather, § 1201(a)(3)(A), the provision cited 
by the defendants, exempts from liability only those people with au-
thority to decrypt a protected DVD.271  Such authority does not come 
from mere ownership of the copy.272 
This decision indicates one of the major problems with the 
DMCA – it requires a person to obtain permission from the copyright 
owner, either through a license or by obtaining an unprotected copy 
which the copyright owner has authorized, in order to exercise any 
rights under the fair use doctrine.  However, this directly conflicts 
with the fair use doctrine because, by definition, any use under the 
doctrine is non-infringing and does not require the permission of the 
copyright owner.273  Consequently, DMCA should be amended, or at 
least, more broadly interpreted by courts, to allow circumvention for 
purposes of fair use.
274
  Absent permission from the copyright owner 
or a change in the essential step defense, consumers of digital down-
loads, who wish to play their encrypted music on media players other 
than the one on which it was purchased, must be able to circumvent 
the protection without penalty.  Although copyright owners may fear 
an increased risk of piracy and infringement, they can use DRM to 
track consumers‟ uses without limiting those uses, because a limita-
tion may lead to consumers‟ inability to own the copies. 
D. Summary of Proposed Amendments 
As long as the courts continue to interpret legislation against 
the rights of the owners of copies, it is necessary to amend the Act in 
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269 See id. 
270 Id. at 444. 
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272 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 444. 
273 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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See generally Devon Thurtle, A Proposed Quick Fix to the DMCA Overprotection 
Problem That Even a Content Provider Could Love . . . Or at Least Live With, 28 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1057 (2005). 
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order to clearly preserve rights such as the first sale doctrine, the es-
sential step defense, and the fair use doctrine.  As recently as Sep-
tember 2011, the Ninth Circuit revisited the first sale doctrine as ap-
plied to software in Apple, Inc. v. Psystar, Corp.275 and, consistent 
with Vernor, held that the manufacturer-copyright owner licensed ra-
ther than sold its software program to its competitor through the use 
of a software licensing agreement.276  In contrast to Vernor, the court 
in Apple acknowledged the existence of agreements that are too re-
strictive, such as where copyright holders “us[e] the conditions to 
stifle competition.”277  Although this concession is helpful in more 
commercial cases between a manufacturer holding the copyright and 
its competitors, it does little to help the average consumer who is not 
purchasing software or digital downloads through software for pur-
poses of competition.278  The legislature must step in to amend the 
Act, prohibiting the overly restrictive licenses mentioned in Apple 
and protecting the consumers. 
With respect to digital downloads, it is important that con-
sumers still be deemed owners based on a first sale standard rather 
than the inevitable license that will accompany the required software.  
Moreover, based on the nature of the technology, consumers of these 
downloads must be able to make necessary reproductions of the cop-
ies and should be able to do so without relying on a license from the 
copyright owner; this requires a change in the essential step defense.  
Otherwise, and as in the current situation, consumers must obtain 
permission from copyright owners to make reproductions, such as 
copies for different rooms in the house or for the car, whereas trans-
porting a CD from one‟s car to computer is acceptable.  Obtaining all 
rights through a contractual agreement vests a significant amount of 
power in the copyright owner and may result in the consumer‟s ina-
bility to own the copy.  In other words, the consumer would not be 
entitled to ownership protections under the Copyright Act, simply be-
cause the nature of a digital download requires that the copyright 
owner grant permission for uses such as reproductions.  Thus, the 
Copyright Act should be amended so that consumers of digital down-
 
275 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). 
276 Id. at 1159-60. 
277 Id. at 1159 (“The copyright misuse doctrine does not prohibit using conditions to con-
trol use of copyrighted material, but it does prevent copyright holders from using the condi-
tions to stifle competition.”). 
278 But see supra notes 169-70 (discussing piracy with respect to digital downloads and 
DRM). 
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loads are not required to obtain permission from copyright owners to 
make necessary reproductions, which would otherwise be considered 
fair uses.  Finally, regardless of whether a court finds ownership in a 
copy, consumers should not be prevented from using the product un-
der the fair use doctrine as a result of DRM encrypted in the down-
load. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Copyright protections and use restrictions placed on digital 
copies have blurred the distinction between a consumer‟s ownership 
of a material object embodying a copyright and a license to the copy-
right by use of the material object.  Although a copy of the material 
product is statutorily distinguishable from the copyright, consumers 
who wish to purchase digital copies are often forced to agree to re-
strictive terms of use, purchase copies with encrypted protections, or 
accept software license agreements.  Further, consumers may only be 
able to access their purchased digital content through related, licensed 
software programs, granting the distributor yet another means to con-
trol the consumer‟s use.  Thus, a consumer purchasing the digital ver-
sion of an author‟s literary work is apparently no longer purchasing a 
copy for ownership, but rather being granted a license.  As a result, 
consumers do not have many of the rights they once had and ex-
pected after purchasing music products, including use of the defenses 
under the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense.  The Cop-
yright Act is no longer effective in providing consumers with such 
ownership rights as digital media becomes increasingly ubiquitous. 
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